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The Implications of RFID Technology 
in University ID Cards 
 
Michael Beaver 
Missouri University of Science and Technology  
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) chips have been rising in popularity because of their 
usefulness and convenience, and have now made their way into the ID cards of universities. An RFID 
chip is an identification device that, when powered by some nearby source, sends out a signal with 
information that was stored in the chip. RFID physical security systems work just like a lock and key, 
with the RFID chip acting as the key. Instead of having a unique pattern, RFID chips have an 
identification code that is read by the lock. Some RFID chips also hide this code behind a series of 
encryptions. While this can be very convenient when used for door locks and quick pay systems, there 
are still many RFID chips that have insufficient securities protecting the information they hold.  Based 
on the increasing trend of RFID usage (RFID forecasts, 2014), it is safe to assume that many more 
universities will follow. However, this convenience could come at the cost of security. The 
implementation of RFID technology in ID cards on college campuses could be a serious security risk if 
universities do not commit to ongoing investments in security and research.  
 
RFID Insecurities 
Northern Arizona University (NAU) is one example of an innovative university that is utilizing 
RFID chips in their student ID cards. This system has allowed professors to record student attendance 
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instructors) became mandatory”(NAU, 2013) in 2012. NAU made this policy because “Numerous 
studies show a strong correlation between attendance and student success” (NAU, 2013) and they have 
seen great results. Even though there are considerable benefits to using RFID chips in student ID cards, 
some argue that they shouldn’t be used for students at all. They believe that the RFID chips provide an 
unacceptable form of tracking on the students that amounts to a breach of student privacy. There are 
even “three Texas bills [that] seek to either curtail or outright ban the use of RFID student trackers” 
(Barnes, 2013). The issue here is whether or not RFID technology is too much of a loose cannon for 
use in student ID cards because while there are very significant benefits, there certainly are risks involved 
that need to addressed. 
In 2013, Francis Brown spoke at a hacking conference about how he successfully accessed an 
RFID physical security system. He accomplished this by discreetly stealing access information from the 
RFID chips in employee entry devices. He then took this information and created a card clone, which 
he used to grant himself access to restricted areas protected by the RFID security systems (Brown, 2013). 
Brown has made all of the information that he used and created for this project available online. These 
resources provide all the tools necessary for anyone to discreetly steal information from RFID chips.  
Chris Paget’s research was completely devoted to reading RFID chips from as far away as 
possible. This involved the use of EPC Gen 2 RFID chips which are significantly different from most 
chips. EPC Gen 2 “supports operation at long distances (e.g., 25-30 feet), and has minimal support for 
security” (Smart Card Alliance, 2006). These chips can be found in various applications such as U.S. 
passports, enhanced drivers licenses, and even “leading organizations, such as the U.S. Department of 
Defense and  Wal-Mart, have set goals for their suppliers to begin using RFID on shipments to their 
organizations” (Saygin & Sarangapani, 2007). Paget was capable of reading these chips from over 200 
feet away, and he believes that longer ranges are possible (Paget, 2010). 
           There are a number of possible consequences to malicious persons being capable of collecting  
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information from RFID systems discreetly and illicitly. Someone could grant themselves access to 
restricted areas, leading to anything from stealing information to obtaining restricted chemicals, the 
ramifications of which could be severe. At the same time, someone could also steal financial and personal 
information and use it to make purchases with the victim’s money. Beyond theft, there are a number 
of   other issues that could arise. If using EPC Gen 2 chips someone could stalk an individual from over 
200 feet away, and thereby determine a student’s daily schedule, and even identify when there are no 
other students nearby. These are just a few examples though, crimes are always changing and becoming 
more complex, and the versatility of RFID chips will only aid that development. 
 
University Security 
Although not every university has implemented RFID technology, it has been continuously 
increasing, and this trend is expected to continue. In 2014 the market worth of RFID technology was 
“$9.2 billion” and “IDTechEx forecast that to rise to $30.24 billion in 2024” (RFID forecasts, 2014). 
Based on this, it should be safe to assume that most universities will eventually implement some form 
of RFID system. When this happens, it is important that universities continually invest in the security of 
their RFID systems. When a university is implementing RFID technology, an investment into both 
security and research needs to be made to ensure the safety of its students. A large initial investment into 
determining what technology is secure and appropriate for the university is necessary to avoid 
preliminary mistakes that could create a very insecure system. This is not where the investment ends 
though. The university needs to be continuously researching the security of their system to stay ahead 
of hackers and other criminals with malicious intent.  
         One university that has begun implementing RFID technology in their ID cards is the Missouri 
University of Science & Technology (S&T). In an interview, Karl Lutzen, the Chief Information Security 
Officer at S&T, noted that when the university was selecting a chip to use, security was a major concern.  
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This is important because he indicated that, starting in 2015, S&T is planning on implementing an RFID 
physical security system in the form of electronic door locks (personal communication, April 4, 2015). 
He also stated that S&T ID cards house a “MIFARE DESFire EV1 Smart Card” which is “compliant 
to all 4 levels of ISO/IEC 14443A0F1” (MIFARE, 2013) and uses a “3DES hardware cryptographic engine 
for enciphering transmission data” (MIFARE, 2013). Triple DES, abbreviated as 3DES, is an encryption 
method that is derived from an older method known as DES. 3DES applies the DES algorithm in 
triplicate in order to create a more secure system. As of the date of this article, there is no known or 
publicized way to break the 3DES encryption. While this system does appear to be very secure there are 
still some possible lapses in protection. For example, Gerhard P. Hancke’s (2006) research examines 
practical attacks on ISO 14443 RFID systems and he discusses that he was able to complete a successful 
relay attack on this type of proximity card. There are also some unsafe procedures being practiced at 
S&T with student ID cards. Lutzen expressed immediate concern when he was told that the front desks 
of residential halls require ID cards as collateral for rentals, which could provide access to each student’s 
account information if a competent hacker was able to acquire them. Because of these concerns, S&T 
has students that will be conducting research with a professor on the RFID system in the 2015-2016 
academic year in order to guarantee the security of the students at S&T. 
 
RFID with Caution 
RFID technology certainly has a place in university ID cards, but not without the ongoing 
investment by universities into security and research. When implementing an RFID system, universities 
should look for a suitable RFID chip to use. When researching RFID chips, it is encouraged that a high 
                                                          
1 ISO stands for the International Organization for Standardization, and they are “an independent, non-governmental 
membership organization” that gives “world-class specifications for products, services and systems, to ensure quality, safety 
and efficiency” (ISO, 2015). ISO 14443A is a classification that defines proximity cards used for identification, and the 
transmission protocols for communicating with it (ISO, 2008). 
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level encryption be a top priority. While it might be tempting to find a chip that is inexpensive, this is 
not an area to cut costs. If a university feels it needs to cut back on how much it spends on an RFID  
system, then it is likely not ready and should instead wait until it can afford to implement the system 
properly. Once in place, the RFID system needs to be maintained. This maintenance involves more than 
just routine procedures to keep the system running. It also involves continuously researching potential 
faults in the security of the RFID system. It is recommended to have this task either delegated to several 
employees who convene semi-regularly to discuss any possible security breaches, or to create a specific 
position with this research as a primary assignment. Some situations may arise where the system seems 
secure at face value, but there is some emerging research suggesting some potential exploits. In this 
situation, a university would likely be hesitant to hastily spend more money on the system, but 
universities shouldn’t be afraid to follow the lead of S&T and allow some undergraduate students the 
opportunity to perform their own research with a professor to investigate the issue. This approach has 
the potential to solve the problem right away, and even if it is unsuccessful, it still would provide 
experiential learning for the students involved. Achieving this level of investment, as is currently being 
done at S&T, is crucial to securely implementing an RFID system. Any university looking to utilize RFID 
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